A philosophical zombie, according to Wikipedia, is a postulate in philosophy concerning entities which are apparently human beings but which have no consciousness. The question, as originally proposed by Thomas Nagel in 1970, defines a p-zombie as a creature with the same behavior as a human, and asks whether there would be any observable difference between the zombie and the normal human.
Dennett, as the debate emerged, objected that by definition the zombie is indistinguishable, since it is defined (by the terms of the question) to have the same behavior.
The question was badly stated. Dennett’s objection confuses the literal terms of the question with its intent. Properly stated, it’s asking whether consciousness makes any difference in observable behavior. On that basis, the answer is Yes, at least some behavior may be notably different; but you have to consider as part of its behavior how it answers questions.
Even if the p-zombie exhibits the same actions as a normal human being, by the terms of the question we know there is at least one difference: the normal human experiences consciousness and the zombie does not. We know that experiences can be described and discussed in the course of a conversation. Questions put to the subject are answered on the basis of his knowledge and experience. Hence we should be able to examine the subject’s experience of consciousness by a suitable discussion, and one thing is a clear: an entity which has never been consciousness will not be able to fake a consistent description of what it’s like to be conscious, whereas a normal person should be able to do it.
This argument is based on the premise that behavior, in the usual sense, is objective and observable, but language exposes subjective beliefs, thoughts, and experience. We can expect, for example, that a zombie would never accept philosophical arguments that consciousness exists, or affects a creature’s behavior — he never experienced it, so as far as the creature knows, there is nothing to which the word “consciousness” corresponds. This is a reasonable explanation for the existence of some philosophers who use a material eliminativist perspective, such as Dennett, the Churchlands, and others. They are human beings, but lack any internal presence of consciousness, so of course they reject theories of its existence.
Of course we would have to be careful of false accusations; we don’t want to start witch hunts. But at least it seems clear that the discussion of zombies has been confused and ineffective, beginning with a poor statement of the question, and by a general failure to recognize that behavior is not the only dimensionality by which we interact with others.
Sometimes we seriously wonder if the whole analytical approach of anglo-american philosophy invites people with some sort of mental distortion. This should have been a simple question.
August 4, 2008 at 7:47 pm
We know that experiences can be described and discussed in the course of a conversation. Questions put to the subject are answered on the basis of his knowledge and experience. Hence we should be able to examine the subject’s experience of consciousness by a suitable discussion
It seems to me this is assuming exactly what you are trying to argue for, namely, that consciousness makes a demonstrable difference, and that it can’t be faked. It is at least conceivably possible that it could be, that something might appear to be conscious when it fact it is not.
Tied into this are the thought experiments of Searle’s Chinese Room and of course the classic question of the Turing Test.
Likewise, I think it’s rather strange to say that Dennett and his supporters must “lack any internal presence of consciousness”. This is not only rather incoherent (arguing against philosophical zombies by claiming your opponents are philosophical zombies?). It also borders on ad hominem which makes it an unattractive argument in general.
Moreover your comments about zombies here are somewhat contradictory; you write that
a zombie would never accept philosophical arguments that consciousness exists, or affects a creature’s behavior — he never experienced it.
Properly speaking, a zombie doesn’t “experience” anything; this precisely why they are a zombie. Yet the possibility exists that a non-conscious system—whether this be a computer a “zombie”, or anything else—might conceivably give the appearance of consciousness in its behavior, presumably including making arguments in favor of consciousness! You are simaltanously missing the point of the zombie analogy and one of the biggest arguments in favor of your position.
This isn’t to say I disagree with you; I don’t care for Anglo-American Analytic philosophy in general or Dennet in particular. But I don’t think you’ve adequately addressed their position; in interpretation of the debate you boil the materialists down to essentially saying “Consciousness doesn’t exist” to which you haughtily reply “Yes it does!”
August 14, 2008 at 11:59 am
The actual point of the article is a sequence of propositions, 1. Speech is not behavior. There is a sense in which speech is behavior, such as when you study someone’s diction, or help them overcome an impediment. But primarily speech is representational or descriptive, it speaks of something other than the speech itself. A zombie by definition has no consciousness to represent in speech, either now or in the past. 2. Without an experience of something, no one can make a consistent description of it. 3. Therefore zombies can be detected by experiment, such as a questionaire.
No one else has brought up this point in regard to pz’s, as far as I know.
There is also a touch of irony you don’t often see in discussions of this subject, namely, what if there really are zombies? What would it be like to talk to them? What would they think of the idea of pz’s? I think they would reject it entirely, because, you know people generalize their own experiences. A pz would assume everybody is the same as itself, and so it would deny virtually all the “silly” features of consciousness, wouldn’t it, from qualia to the so-called cartesian theater. And that’s just exactly what some philosophers do. Which leads you to wonder…
As for the criticism of other philosophers, that’s one of the more fun things to the business, and Dennett sets a high standard. Some of his scathing replies would embarrass a statue. But we should recognize merit and skill when encountered. I think must people could not equal Dennett’s blazing ripostes, and I don’t pretend to be as good.
Lastly, I would like to thank you for taking the time and trouble to read my little column. I present it for the amusement of those who enjoy it, and those who don’t are welcome to their own beliefs.